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Abstract  
What is the effect of external stimuli in curbing corruption at the national level? This article 
analyses the intervening impact of EU post-conditionality and GRECO monitoring on 
FRXQWULHV¶ anti-corruption record. It finds that ³soft governance´ has a positive impact and 
stimulates national responses against corruption. This positive influence increases when is 
additionally conditioned by strong internal stimuli targeting corruption. 
Keywords Bulgaria ÂFRUUXSWLRQÂEU Â GRECO Â post-FRQGLWLRQDOLW\Â Romania   
  
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The search for measures that can curb and prevent corrupt practices is currently receiving an 
increased interest across disciplines. Corruption deterrents were so far identified in the form 
of values, social capital, civil society, civic culture (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, Peiffer and 
Alvarez 2015), independent judiciary (Jain 2001) anti-corruption agencies and domestic 
political willingness (Doig 1995, Quah 2010). Within this line of research, this article 
investigates the impact of soft governance on the adoption and effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures. Of specific interest is the impact of EU post-conditionality and of 
*URXSRI6WDWHVDJDLQVW&RUUXSWLRQ*5(&2RQFRXQWULHV¶DQWL-corruption records.  
The implementation of anti-corruption measures depends on geographic, economic and 
demographic internal factors such as: the size of a country, the size of its population and its 
GDP per capita. An important prerequisite for the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is 
the level of political willingness which is manifested when governments offer funding and 
staffing to independent anti-corruption agencies (Quah 1984, 2003). Additional intervening 
factors are the external influence of various institutions such as the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (initiated by the US Congress), the EU (via enlargement conditionality and 
European Neighbourhood Policy) (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, Spendzarova and Vachudova 
2012a). 
EU conditionality was partly designed with corruption-deterring in mind; but the accounts of 
its success are mixed. The EU can bring pressure on governments to adopt institutional 
reforms but its input is considered to have modest results, especially if the institutional 
change and performance at the moment of accession was considered unsatisfactory 
(Sedelmeier 2012, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Others, however, consider the positive impact of 
external incentives and recognize them as a mechanism which ³can help galvanize the media 
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and civil society and put corruption cases in the spotlight´ (Spendzarova and Vachudova 
2012b: 8). In addition to this debate, existing research on the process of external 
conditionality acknowledges the problem of isolating the international factors from the 
domestic ones in determining the success of anti-corruption reforms (Sasse 2008; Hughes et 
al. 2004).  
This article applies a stimulus-response model to anti-corruption records. Stimuli are actions 
of national and international political and social actors aimed at evoking anti-corruption 
responses from national decision makers. The focus is on EU conditionality following 
accession, in other words on EU post-conditionality and its success at curbing corruption. 
The article seeks to ascertain whether countries have adopted laws and institutions aimed at 
downsizing or preventing corruption following EU recommendations (as per EU reports) or 
through their own political initiative in responding to electoral, civil society or to other 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWRUV¶ SUHVVXUH The analysis provides a systematic account of the timing of 
reforms and their targets in both Romania and Bulgaria whilst also considering the impact of 
other international organizations such as GRECO. 
External stimuli as corruption deterrents: two competing explanations 
The adoption of anti-corruption national reforms is a desirable starting point. The 
effectiveness of their implementation and the adoption of preventative measures have lately 
become the focus of national and international institutions. GRECO has been monitoring 
countries in their fight against corruption on a voluntary basis since 1999. Most European 
countries have joined GRECO, some even before joining the EU. The question, therefore, is 
ZKHWKHUFRXQWULHV¶DQWL-corruption efforts are more effective as a result of the EU monitoring 
their progress after accession. Of interest is the EU¶VDQG*5(&2¶V intervening influence in 
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FRXQWULHV¶DQWL-corruption legal efforts. In what follows, two theoretical perspectives will be 
discussed and two propositions developed.  
 
Ineffective soft governance? 
Soft governance has developed as a response to the challenge of diverse societies and 
interdependence of political actors and works through cooperative regulation and the setting 
of joint targets rather than top-down uniform regulation (Smismans 2011). For example, the 
EU is applying a certain degree of soft governance across complex policies such as cohesion, 
social employment, environment where cross-national agreement would have been very 
difficult to obtain. This type of governance however has been evaluated as being inefficient 
(Bulmer et al. 2007, Copeland and Papadimitriou 2012) due to its lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. Soft governance makes use of policy instruments such as recommendations, 
guidelines, targets, agreed objectives or ³benchmarks´ which are all flexible, non-
hierarchical, open and participatory forms of policy development. All these instruments are 
accompanied by weak peer review and stand separately from the legal process of courts. 
They also have ³limited operational effectiveness when members states are not fully in 
accord regarding the end goal of a policy´ (Buonanno and Nugent 2013: 133). In case of anti-
corruption policy, the end goal implies its reduction. The effective means towards this goal 
however is influenced by the national context. The soft instruments are all part of a reflexive 
process which aid horizontal policy coordination across states, while the details of policy 
development are left entirely in the hands of the national states.  
 Previous research has predicted deterioration of compliance with EU law after accession in 
the former communist states (Ganev 2013). Various other authors emphasized the temporal 
limits of conditionality in influencing anti-corruption reforms (Sedelmeier 2012, Bohmelt and 
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Freyburg 2012). Once a state becomes an EU member, the incentive to comply diminishes. 
EU has hence decided to extend conditionality and monitoring even after membership for 
Romania and Bulgaria since 2007. EU post conditionality was set up with the aim of reducing 
the negative effect of domestic partisan and institutional veto players which might prefer the 
institutional status quo in place prior to accession.  
EU post-conditionality can be categorized as a form of EU soft governance given its soft 
policy instruments embedded in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The 
evaluation and monitoring reports on corruption have the intended effect of applying peer 
pressure if the performance of countries is poor. The question that arises is whether indeed 
this peer pressure can make a difference in the fight against corruption. In the case of post-
conditionality peer pressure manifests itself in the form of criticism and recommendations. 
These are directed at each country but have no immediate binding consequences and 
penalties. If we follow the logic of soft governance, EU post-conditionality would be 
expected to have a low impact with regards to reducing corruption. GRECO monitoring 
through its evaluation rounds and reports can be included in the same category of soft 
governance as they do not have a binding effect. GRECO¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVUHTXLUHDFWLRQ
within 18 months but members are not required to report its observations in the subsequent 
compliance procedure. Following this line of argument, the proposition to be tested is that, on 
their own: 
P1. External criticism and recommendations have a limited impact on reducing corruption.  
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Effective national responses conditioned by internal and external stimuli  
This article argues that an effective national response is conditioned by both external 
(international) and internal (national) stimuli. The stimuli to curb corruption come from 
external but also from internal actors and take the form of evaluations (positive and non-
positive) and recommendations. External actors are international organizations such as the 
EU or GRECO, while internal actors can be non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
politicians who initiate legislation or citizens who organize protests against corruption or 
denounce corrupt practices. The responses refer to the adoption of anti-corruption measures 
but also to their implementation and effectiveness. The anti-corruption measures involve 
legislation in the administration and judicial system or clearly labelled laws against 
corruption.  
A stimulus-response model provides a political and temporal account of the context in which 
post-conditionality and other external recommendations and criticism are applied.  Domestic 
political actors act under both internal (social) and external (international) constraints and 
their response can translate into effective measures against corruption. The latter includes 
national strategies against corruption and legislative measures which can tackle both grand 
and petty corruption. Domestic stimuli such as political willingness and civic pressure 
contribute to the reduction of corruption even in the absence of external pressures (Peiffer 
and Alvarez 2015, Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). However, when both internal and external 
constraints are present, the national response against corruption is expected to be more 
extensive. Henceforth, the following interactive proposition is advanced: 
P2: External recommendations and criticisms contribute to the reduction of corruption when 
internal stimuli are present.   
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Variables 
External stimuli 
The external stimuli are measured by the amount of criticism and recommendations per 
theme as reflected in official institutional reports from the EU and GRECO. Detailed 
examples of criticism and recommendations are presented in the online appendix, Table 1. At 
the time of accession in 2007, both Romania and Bulgaria registered deficits in the field of 
judicial reform, organized crime and corruption. The EU decided to establish a special 
³cooperation and verification mechanism´ in order to assist the two new members in dealing 
with the outstanding challenges (European Commission 2015). Consequently, in December 
2006, the Commission adopted ³benchmarks´ which consisted of criteria for assessing the 
progress registered in the areas of administrative and judicial systems and corruption. The 
benchmarks were slightly different and adapted to the needs and past performance of each 
country1. Subsequently, the Commission published annual progress reports. 
The other anti-corruption external stimulus considered in this article comes from GRECO 
which is a Council of Europe body which has the aim of helping its members fight 
corruption. States join on a voluntary basis and agree to be monitored on a regular basis. The 
monitoring process identifies shortages in national anti-corruption policies and supports states 
in this endeavour by prompting legislative, institutional and practical reforms. Romania and 
Bulgaria were amongst the GRECO founding members in 1999 and since then have been 
subjected to four evaluation rounds.  
 
                                                          
1
 /ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƵůŐĂƌŝĂƚŚĞ ?ďĞŶĐŚŵĂƌŬƐǁĞƌĞŵĂŝŶůǇƐĞƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘non-partisan investigations 
into allegations of high-level corruption ? ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞůĂŶĚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚ
organized crime. ZŽŵĂŶŝĂ ?Ɛ ?ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƵůŐĂƌŝĂ ?
but additionally the establishment of an integrity agency and the need for measures aimed at preventing 
corruption (European Commission 2006a, 2006b). 
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Internal stimuli 
Internal stimuli generate an impetus in the national fight against corruption and refer to social 
pressure and political willingness to curb corrupt practices. Social stimuli range from street 
protests, NGO activity against corruption, a free press monitoring corruption scandals, to 
individual complaints to the anti-corruption agency. Political willingness means the de facto 
commitment of elites to curb corruption and is more difficult to measure. It can be identified 
in the lack of political interference in national agencies against corruption or in the national 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶commitment to curb corruption. For example, national parliaments can decide to 
remove the immunity of corrupt politicians to facilitate prosecution. Another indicator of 
political willingness to fight corruption is a low degree of political vendetta. In other words, 
corruption cases do not only target opposition parties, but all suspected political actors. 
National responses 
The dependent variable is the national responses which refer to official measures adopted in 
order to reduce and deter corruption. These are the adoption and modifications of laws with 
clear reference to various forms of corruption or the adoption of national strategies against 
corruption. Their implementation can be gauged by tracing the number of corruption cases 
and convictions which have been dealt with by the justice system in every country. The 
values and interpretation of this proxy measure may be problematic when political vendetta is 
practiced or when the government is tacitly accepting corruption. In both cases the latter 
measure will not accurately reflect the level of corruption. This is partly corrected by the 
World Governance Indicator (WGI) on the control of corruption which reports figures based 
on the opinions of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents. 
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Data and empirical strategy  
The data used in this analysis is based on official annual reports published by the European 
Commission from 2007 until 2014 and by GRECO from 2001 until 2014. The dataset 
comprises 32 EU reports and 8 GRECO reports which were scrutinized with regards to 
criticisms and recommendations offered by both institutions to Romania and Bulgaria.2 These 
countries are chosen as case studies because they were the only countries against which the 
Commission started a post-accession CVM procedure. Both countries have institutional 
features (party list proportional representation) are linked in the literature with high 
corruption (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Another reason for their selection is the 
recent contrasting performance registered by Romania in comparison with Bulgaria 
(Transparency International 2016, Public Integrity Index 2016). This offers a good 
opportunity for exploring the reasons behind their distinct records in the fight against 
corruption. 
The content analysis of the above-mentioned documents reports the longitudinal frequency of 
both criticisms and recommendations per theme as offered by both GRECO and the European 
Commission. The substantive content of both recommendations and criticisms is monitored 
across time in order to check the correspondence between external criticisms and national 
measures adopted. 
In order to test P1, the effectiveness of the external stimuli is measured by the longitudinal 
change in various indicators of corruption3 before and after accession and their sequential 
                                                          
2
 The EU CVM reports are published twice a year, while the GRECO reports were released once every three to 
five years. GRECO analysis is based on meetings with public officials and members of civil society but also the 
latter replies to questionnaires applied by GRECO. The EU reports are prepared after the Commission 
organizes expert missions to both countries three times a year. During these visits the experts consult with the 
government, non-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐůŽĐĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? 
3
 The World Governance indicators (WGI) are comparable across time. The Corruption Perception Index as 
compiled by Transparency International (TI) is comparable only from 2012.  For other new indicators such as 
the Public Integrity Index there is no time series data collected yet.  
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association with the recommendations and criticisms from the European Commission and 
GRECO. In order to test P2, the temporal dimension will allow us at least partly to 
disentangle the effect of national and international stimuli on the intensity of national 
responses. The substantive (i.e. theme related) longitudinal evolution of criticism and 
recommendations will be compared with the measures taken at the national level.  
Results 
Criticisms and recommendations 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of criticism and recommendations received by Romanian and 
Bulgarian authorities. The reported percentages show the frequency of criticism and 
recommendations from each annual report. The time periods for high external criticism and 
recommendations does not coincide in both countries.  
In the case of Bulgaria, the content analysis of EU CVM reports reveals that, the peak of EU 
criticism happened in 2009, 2011 and 2013. In 2009 Bulgarian authorities were criticised for 
not having initiated investigations into fraud and corruption. The areas affected by corruption 
and mentioned by the European Commission in Bulgaria included health, education and a 
mismatch between police investigations and criminal procedures (European Commission 
2009a). A major concern at the time was the high number of killings in relation to crime and 
corruption and the small number of cases which were investigated by the judiciary.  
 
[fig 1 CVM about here] 
The 2011 Commission reports for Bulgaria conveyed high level of acquittals in cases of 
organised crime, fraud and corruption. The judiciary was not considered fully accountable 
and transparent, and the Commission considered that the Bulgarian judiciary needed further 
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strengthening following legislative changes. The new specialised department in the Supreme 
Prosecution Office established in 2006 had shortcomings in its judicial and investigative 
practices. In 2013 EU concerns were reported, especially about Bulgarian police and judicial 
appointments. Of particular concern was the very low success rate in fighting organised crime 
despite new asset forfeiture laws intended to weaken crime structures. 
For Romania, the content analysis of Commission CVM reports shows us that the EU post-
conditionality manifests in diminished criticism by 2014. In comparison with Bulgaria, the 
magnitude of both non-positive evaluations and recommendations is lower and decreased 
significantly following accession. The peak of EU criticism for Romania occurred in 2008, 
2010 and 2013. 
Following EU accession, the Commission reported in 2008 that Romania had a very low 
number of actual convictions for corruption due to poor administrative capacity which 
stemmed from a weak legal framework for the adjudication of corruption cases. The result 
was the absence of consistent and efficient procedures to handle corruption cases (European 
Commission 2009a). In the 2013 CVM report the Romanian judicial system was described as 
being ineffective in both administrative and legal terms. Legal inconsistencies and ad-hoc 
reforms were notified as weak points, together with the absence of judicial competence to 
tackle corruption in public procurement.  
 
National responses 
In order to test P1, the first step is to analyse the association between the corruption 
indicators and the intensity of recommendations and criticism. If post conditionality has a 
positive effect then we would expect periods of high level criticism to be followed by an 
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improved country score in combating corruption. In other words, lower country corruption is 
expected in the years following those with high criticism from the Commission and GRECO. 
As figure 2 shows, periods of improved WGI scores for Bulgaria in 2010 and 2012 do indeed 
follow periods of criticism. The improved anti-corruption performance as reported by the 
WGI scores is additionally validated by the Commission reports. Important steps forward 
were identified by the Commission in its 2010 reports for Bulgaria included the public 
recognition of allegations of corruption within the judiciary and a public acknowledgment of 
the need for a judiciary reform through a detailed action plan. Progress in the basic Bulgarian 
legislative framework was also noted by the Commission in the 2012 CVM report, together 
with a political commitment to reforms. 
[fig 2 WGI about here] 
Higher WGI scores (lower corruption) in 2009, 2010 and 2011 are corroborated with 
evidence of measures adopted by the Bulgarian authorities. In 2009 the European 
commission reported progress against benchmarks. ³In response to the CVM report of July 
2008 joint teams counteracting EU fraud, organised crime and corruption and money 
laundering were set up at the Supreme Cassation Prosecution Office´ (European Commission 
2009b). Additionally, several legislative reforms were praised, especially The Conflict of 
Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act of 16 October 2008. This legal measure targets 
conflict of interest between public functions and private interests.  
A similar trend is noticeable for Romania. Low WGI scores are recorded in years preceding 
high criticism from the Commission. Conversely, improved WGI scores are noted in 2011 
and 2014, the years which followed acute criticism from the EU (2010 and 2013 
respectively). Despite commitment to reforms not being uniform across political parties by 
2009, some progress was reported by the European Commission after that in the organisation 
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and staffing of the Romanian judiciary (European Commission 2009a). In the 2012 CVM 
report, the number of legislative reforms increased and improvement was also noticed in the 
track record of the persecution in high level corruption cases. This explains considerable 
improvement in the anticorruption scores in 2013 and 2014. 
Figures 1 and 2 show a rather disjointed evolution of the fight against corruption in both 
countries. Bulgaria performed better compared to Romania from 1997 until 2007 (fig. 2). 
After accession Bulgaria regressed, especially in 2008 and 2014, while Romania experienced 
a cyclical evolution. Most years of Romanian improvements after accession were mirrored by 
Bulgarian regression. It should be noted that both countries were subject to the CVM 
procedure and both were being monitored by GRECO as well. Overall, Romania showed 
more progress after accession as also demonstrated by diminished criticism received from 
GRECO after accession. Bulgaria performed much better in this respect before 2007 (see 
table 1 Appendix). Even if the evolution of counWULHV¶:*,VFRUHVLVQRWOLQHDUDQGHYHQLI
Bulgaria regressed in 2008 and 2014, figure 2 also shows periods of improvement which 
altogether cannot completely disqualify the impact of external stimuli. In addition, 
considering that Romania has made considerable improvement, we therefore have some 
evidence against P1.  
Since GRECO monitoring started, both countries registered noticeable annual improvement 
until EU accession (fig 2). This is an indication that external pressure helps. The addition of 
post-conditionality following accession has worked even better for Romania in recent years. 
The analysis of the substantive content of criticism and recommendations before accession 
clearly reveals that the legislation adopted by countries after evaluation rounds was related to 
the criticism and recommendations received from GRECO at the time of each evaluation.  
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Table 2 appendix shows that most of the corruption related legislation adopted by Romania 
EHIRUHWKH*5(&2URXQGLQFRUUHVSRQGVWR*5(&2¶V3ULQFLSOHs 7 and 34 which were 
WKH IRFXVRI WKHSUHYLRXVHYDOXDWLRQ URXQG5RPDQLD¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKRVHSULQFLSOHV
received substantial criticism in 2001. Furthermore, it is also evident that legislation adopted 
before each GRECO round is not entirely related to the evaluation principles of the previous 
URXQG DQG KHQFHIRUWK VKRZV WKDW FRXQWULHV GR QRW IROORZ H[FOXVLYHO\ *5(&2¶V
recommendation and criticisms. The other legislative initiatives might have been prompted 
by EU conditionality and post-conditionality or by the national elite.  
Table 3 appendix reveals that the legislation adopted after 2007 by both countries was in line 
with EU post-conditionality benchmarks. Bulgaria performed better after accession but 
regressed after 2010. What is missing from the Bulgarian response was legislation in line 
with Benchmark 3 which asks for judicial reform and improvements in efficiency. Romania 
in exchange adopted legislation in line with more than one benchmark in those years where 
progress is also noticeable in corruption indicators. It is worth noting that GRECO principles 
and the EU benchmarks largely overlap (see online appendix). This implies that the two 
LQVWLWXWLRQVUHLQIRUFHHDFKRWKHU¶VLQIOXHQFHRQQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHV 
5RPDQLD¶V QDWLRQDO UHVSRQVH ZDV VWURQJer through the adoption of national anti-corruption 
strategies for 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2012-2015, whilst Bulgaria has never had such a 
national strategy.5 Considering the disjointed evolution of the two countries, if the initial 
argument behind P2 is correct, we would expect the better Romanian results be conditioned 
by strong(er) national stimuli. A discussion of the national stimuli in the form of civic and 
political willingness follows in the next section.  
                                                          
4
 'ZK ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐŽƌďŽĚŝĞƐŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞŽf fighting 
ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨĂůůƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?
prosecuting and adjudicating corruption offences (Council of Europe, 2016). 
5
 Amongst the New EU12, other countries which did not adopt a national anti-corruption strategy include Malta, 
Lithuania, Cyprus, Czech Republic. 
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Stimulus from citizens and NGOs 
In order to test P2, two national intervening variables are discussed: stimuli from active 
citizens and levels of political willingness. Anti-corruption civic activism comprises 
individual responsible citizens willing to fight corruption and to denounce corrupt practices. 
It also includes popular protest against corruption and the work of national NGOs against 
FRUUXSWSUDFWLFHV+HQFHWKHQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHFDQEHSURPSWHGE\FLWL]HQV¶HQJDJHPHQWDQG
activism. Informed citizens can push forward the agenda of controlling corruption. By 2014, 
a majority of citizens in Romania knew about the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(56%) while a lower percentage (only 44%) were informed about it in Bulgaria (Flash 
Eurobarometer 406, 2014). While noticing improvements, a similarly high proportion of 
Romanians believed that the EU had a positive impact on improving judicial problems and on 
combating corruption (73 percent and 67 percent respectively). The proportion of citizens 
holding the same opinions in Bulgaria was lower by more than 10 percentage points.  
The stimulus from Romanian society can also be classified as high with respect to public 
denunciations to the National Directorate against Corruption (DNA). By 2015, about two 
thirds of the cases investigated by the anti-corruption agency were reported by citizens 
(DNA, 2015). There is no clear longitudinal Bulgarian data on the number of cases reported 
by citizens. However, a net difference between the number of cases reported by the anti-
corruption institutions and the number of corruption cases identified by the NGOs has been 
reported (CSD 2012).  In 2009 and 2014 Bulgaria received the highest level of criticism from 
GRECO (see Fig. 1 and table 1 appendix). This is corroborated by the very high percentages 
of Bulgarians (29 percent in 2014) who admitted giving bribes (CSD 2014: 2). The level of 
civic action against corruption therefore decreased together with trust in public officials. 
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Both Romania and Bulgaria experienced sustained activity against corruption from the late 
1990s onwards. The number of registered NGOs appears to be slightly higher and more 
active in Romania, even though Transparency International started its activity two years 
earlier in Bulgaria (in 1998).6 Several NGOs, however, such as The Expert Forum (EFOR) in 
Romania are also part of the Open Government Partnership initiative7 which provides the 
platform for a dialogue on strategies and legal drafts between governments and EFOR 
experts. Other NGOs operate as association of organizations, such as the Alliance for a Clean 
Romania. Even if Bulgarian NGOs were numerous, by 2009, the year when the European 
Commission strongly criticised Bulgaria, it was reported that most non-governmental 
organizations had been captured by politicians (CSD 2009).  
Through social media, these civic organizations have been very active in stimulating public 
protest in both countries. One such event led to the resignation of the Romanian government 
in November 2014 when one of the public slogans was ³corruption kills´. Similar protests 
were organized in Bulgaria in 2013 when part of the civic mobilization and popular protest 
was organized under slogans such as ³Down go the Mafia. Power to Citizens´. The February 
2013 protests were triggered by indignation with the government when a corrupt figure was 
proposed to manage the State Agency for National Security (Tsoneva and Medarov, n.d.).  
Political willingness 
If the argument of external stimuli being more effective when mediated by internal stimuli is 
correct, we should expect that national responses and measures against corruption are 
implemented by all governments irrespective of ideological orientation. By the same 
reasoning, national agencies against corruption are expected to handle high level cases of 
                                                          
6
 In addition to Transparency International, a list of NGOs fight corruption comprises amongst others, in 
Romania: The Alliance for a Clean Romania (http://sar.org.ro), The Expert Forum (EFOR, http:expertforum.ro), 
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP; http: riseproject.ro); and in Bulgaria: The 
Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, www.csd.bg) and its initiative the Coalition 2000 process;  
7
 Open Government Partnership, http://www.opengovpartnership.org/, last accessed June 2016.  
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corruption which target both opposition and government officials.  Romanian data show that 
there was no political vendetta when fighting corruption through the prosecution of high level 
corrupt politicians, as most cases opened by the DNA involved politicians from both the 
opposition and the government. By 2014, 44 percent of the politicians accused of corruption 
(indicted, arrested or convicted) were from the governing party, while the opposition cases 
amounted to less than half of that (19 percent). The number of cases of grand corruption 
under investigation by the DNA increased in Romania from 1 case in 2002, to 71 cases in 
2009 and 237 in 2014 (DNA 2014). Similarly, the number of prosecutions as reported by the 
DNA increased from 298 in 2011 to 743 in 2012 and 1051 in 2013 (DNA 2013). This data is 
positively corroborated by measures which show that judicial independence strengthened, 
especially after 2012 (ERCAS 2015). Consequently the operational efficiency of the DNA 
improved considerably in subsequent years.  
This trend was not paralleled in Bulgaria where, for example, corrupt politicians were still 
appointed to high level positions in 2013 (Tsoneva and Medarov, n.d.). Immediately after 
accession, between 2007 and 2008, the number of criminal prosecutions for corruption and 
organized crime offences decreased, which was not in line with the actual number of such 
offences (CSD 2009: 10). Additionally, the low levels of political willingness were revealed 
by an increase in pressures relating to bribery following accession. The percentage of 
Bulgarians who were asked for a bribe increased from 18 percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 
2014 (CSD 2014: 2). By 2016, the level of judicial independence in Bulgaria was two points 
lower than in Romania8 (IPI 2016).  
                                                          
8
 The IPPI score on judicial independence ranges from 1 = heavily influenced to 7 = entirely independent. 
The Romanian score for judicial independence in 2016 was reported as 5.58 and for Bulgaria 3.5. 
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In conclusion, these last two sections illustrate that after 2007, both political and civic 
national stimuli were stronger in Romania than in Bulgaria and, combined with external 
stimuli, contributed to progress rather than backsliding as it occurred in Bulgaria.  
Conclusion 
This article has shown that, ³soft governance´ in the form of external stimuli can have a 
positive impact on the adoption of national measures targeting corruption. Additionally the 
strength and effectiveness of national responses are positively conditioned by the activity of 
individual citizens and civil society more generally, as well as by the willingness of national 
political elites to fight corruption.  
At least in the short run, EU post-conditionality and GRECO monitoring do have a positive 
direct impact on national responses against corruption. The comparison of Romania and 
Bulgaria reveals that the national responses they stimulate are even stronger in conditions of 
national (internal) political and social willingness to curb corrupt practices. These similar 
cases in terms of background show that the institutional settings and the fight against 
FRUUXSWLRQDWWKHWLPHRI(8DFFHVVLRQDUHQRWWKHGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRUVRQDFRXQWU\¶VIXWXUH
performance; rather, what is more important is the national political and civic stimuli which 
develop in each country after accession. The strong impact of the latter has also been seen in 
early 2017 when demonstrations against corruption forced the Romanian government to 
repeal a controversial ordinance regulating the abuse of power and conflict of interests.  
Soft governance can be effective as an external stimulus in the sense of triggering national 
responses, which are themselves likely to be more robust when internal stimuli are present. 
The analysis of external criticism, recommendation and national legislation suggests that 
countries do respond to external stimuli but even more so in the presence of existing domestic 
initiatives. These results open the door to larger systematic comparative studies of legislative 
19 
 
measures against corruption and to detailed process tracing of policy making in this area.
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Appendix:  
Table 1. GRECO evaluation rounds for Romania and Bulgaria 
Evaluation Round RO  2001 BG  
2001 
RO 
2005 
BG 
2005 
RO 
2009 
BG 
2009 
BG 
2014 
RO 
2014 
Recommendations 
(%) 13 
 
10 
 
11 
 
4 
 
6 
 
7 
 
11 
 
7 
Criticisms (%)  
21 
 
12 
 
30 
 
16 
 
21 
 
30 
 
26 
 
29 
Word count 
report (N) 
 
14279 
 
10603 
 
11085 
 
11277 
 
38377 
 
29359 
 
30107 
 
28024 
Source: GRECO https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/index_en.asp 
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Appendix 
Table 2. Greco evaluation per themes and national measures adopted. 
Evaluation Round RO  2001 BG  2001 RO 2005 BG 2005 RO  2009 BG  2009 BG 2014 RO 2014 
Principle P3 P6 P7 P3 P6 P7 T 1 T 2 T 3 T 1 T 2 T 3 T 1 T 2 T 1 T 2 MPs Jud Pr MPs Jud Pr 
Recommendations 
(%) 17 10 13 17 17 8 10 11 15 3 6 4 5 8 4 9 12 11 14 9 6 9 
Criticism (%) 29 28 16 19 15 12 31 38 24 15 21 18 18 26 23 37 72 28 27 40 26 24 
Laws adopted per 
round principles 1 5 6 6 0 1 2 7 2 3 2 1 9 9 2 5 
 
T1: 1 
  
T1: 1 
  Laws adopted 
outside round 
principles 
T2: 11 
T1: 5 
T3: 1 
T1: 1 
T2: 4 
P7: 11 
P3: 8 
P7: 6 
P3: 11 
P6: 1 T3: 5 
T3: 2 
P: 33 
T2: 5 
P7: 1 T2: 4 
Source:  GRECO evaluation rounds: GRECO https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/index_en.asp;  
National legislation: https://www.acauthorities.org/, www.legislationonline.org, last accessed 2015.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of EU criticism and recommendations (%) 
 
 
Note: The lines show in percentages the substantive allocation to criticism and 
recommendations from each annual CVM report.   
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Figure 2: Evolution of WGI scores 1996-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicator (Control of Corruption) 
www.govindicators.org 
